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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 07-4307 
___________ 
 
SALIH HALL**; 
KENNETH M. SMITH*; 
LLOYD DIXON, III, 
               Appellants 
 
v. 
 
GOVERNOR RUTH ANN MINNER; JOSEPH BEAU BIDEN,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE;  
JAMES T. VAUGHN, President Judge of the Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware; CARL C. DANBERG, COMMISSIONER  
OF THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
RENATA HENRY, Director of the Delaware Division of  
Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
 
* Dismissed pursuant to Clerk's Order of 11/19/09. 
** Dismissed pursuant to Clerk's Order of 12/01/10. 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00392) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 9, 2010 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 5, 2011) 
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_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Lloyd Dixon, III, a Delaware inmate, commenced this suit along with two other 
inmates by filing a pro se complaint in the District Court for the District of Delaware 
purporting to seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  Although the complaint sets forth numerous allegations, we 
briefly summarize the allegations that are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. 
 Dixon was convicted in 1994 of first-degree burglary; based on his history of prior 
felony convictions, he was sentenced as an “habitual offender” to life imprisonment.  See 
Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1223 (Del. 1996).  Under Delaware law, a life sentence is 
required for “[a]ny person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony ... and who shall 
thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony[.]”  11 Del. Code § 4214(b).  The 
Delaware Supreme Court has “held that the legislature intended to reserve the habitual 
offender penalties for those individuals who were not rehabilitated after the specified 
number of separate encounters with the criminal justice system and a corresponding 
number of chances to reform.”  Buckingham v. State, 482 A.2d 327, 330 (Del. 1984). 
 Dixon contends in this suit that the predicate felony convictions that formed the 
basis for his habitual-offender sentence were the result of conduct that he engaged in 
while suffering from chemical dependency or drug addiction.  He alleges that the state 
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officials named here as defendants failed, allegedly due to a discriminatory animus, to 
afford opportunities for Dixon to receive drug treatment following his earlier convictions.  
In doing so, Dixon claims, defendants failed to afford him a “chance to reform” so that he 
could avoid becoming an habitual offender.   
 Dixon asserts that his chemical dependency is a disease and “disability” under the 
ADA, and that his disease went untreated despite the State having received federal funds 
to provide treatment.  Claiming that defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to his 
need for treatment so that he could avoid future felony convictions, Dixon asked the 
District Court, inter alia, to declare his habitual-offender sentence unconstitutional 
“because [he was] never provided the requisite number of treatment opportunities before 
being declared incorrigible under habitual offender proceedings.”  Complaint at ¶ 35.  
Dixon also sought class certification on behalf of other inmates similarly situated.  
 The District Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  In a 
subsequent order, the Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, and determined that any amendment to the complaint would be futile.  Dixon 
and his fellow plaintiffs timely filed this appeal.1
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs Salih Hall and Kenneth M. Smith initially joined in the appeal.  Smith 
later voluntarily withdrew, and Hall was dismissed from the appeal after he was denied 
leave to proceed IFP and failed to pay the filing fee.  Dixon, the lone remaining appellant, 
is proceeding IFP on appeal.  Our review is limited to Dixon’s claims.   
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 This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of an IFP complaint for failure to state 
a claim.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 The District Court rejected Dixon’s Title II claims for a variety of reasons, but we 
need only address one of those reasons -- the statute of limitations -- because it plainly 
dictates dismissal.  A district court has authority to dismiss a complaint sua sponte under 
§ 1915(e) where, as here, the statute of limitations defense is obvious from the face of the 
complaint and no development of the factual record is required.  See, e.g., Fogle v. 
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).  “[T]he statute of limitations applicable to 
claims under Title II of the ADA … is the statute of limitations for personal injury 
actions in the state in which the trial court sits.”  Disabled in Action v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 
199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008).  The state at issue here, Delaware, has a two-year limitations 
period.  See 10 Del. Code § 8119.  “[A] federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff 
discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis 
for the claim.”  Disabled in Action, 539 F.3d at 209 (quotation marks omitted).   
 Dixon was sentenced as an habitual offender in 1994.  He filed this suit thirteen 
years later, on June 16, 2007.  Dixon is plainly time barred as to any claim that he might 
assert under Title II based on an alleged failure to afford treatment for his drug addiction 
-- treatment which, according to the complaint, should have been provided in the years 
prior to Dixon’s 1994 sentencing as an habitual offender.  It is clear that any amendment 
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to the complaint to correct this defect would be futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 Insofar as Dixon’s pro se complaint can be read liberally to assert a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, such as a claim of deliberate indifference to a past serious medical need 
for drug treatment, see Complaint at ¶ 31, the same two-year statute of limitations period 
applies.  See McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 1996).  Our 
review of the complaint reveals no basis for any claim under § 1983 that can be said to 
have accrued within two years prior to Dixon’s filing of this suit on June 16, 2007.  
 Finally, we agree with the District Court that Dixon’s request to have his sentence 
declared unconstitutional improperly crosses the line into a request for habeas corpus 
relief.  As this Court has explained, “whenever the challenge ultimately attacks the ‘core 
of habeas’ -- the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence 
-- a challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought 
by way of a habeas corpus petition.”  Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Title II and § 1983 do not provide a means for Dixon to overturn his 
presumptively valid criminal sentence. 
 In sum, and after a review of the entire record, we conclude that Dixon’s claims 
were properly dismissed.  Because his appeal lacks arguable legal merit, see Neitzke v. 
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), we will dismiss it under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Dixon’s 
motion for summary action is denied. 
